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Dear reader
It is a great pleasure to present the first UBS Center Public 
Paper entitled “China’s Great Convergence and Beyond”. 
The launch of this new Public Paper series is a central initiative 
within the UBS Center’s aspiration to provide new relevant 
research findings on key economic topics of our time to a 
broad audience. As the name implies, these papers are directed 
to the interested public at large. While the authors will always 
be international top specialists on the topics covered, the Public 
Papers are written in a clear, compact, and highly readable 
 format, free of academic jargon and understandable without 
prior knowledge about the subject.
And what better topic for the first Public Paper than the  (re-)
emergence of China as a world economic power? The ascent 
 of China is one of the most important features in today’s 
 global economic and political landscape. In this public paper, 
the authors present the latest academic insights into what lies 
behind China’s fast rise and discuss the factors which can 
 sustain or jeopardize its future growth.
You will receive the answers to these and related questions 
from two globally leading specialists on the Chinese economy, 
Prof. Kjetil Storesletten and Prof. Fabrizio Zilibotti. In 2012, 
they were the first western scholars to be awarded the highest 
ranked Chinese award for economists, the Sun Yefang 
 Economic Science Award.
All that remains is for me to wish you much interest while 
reading it!
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China is today one of the world’s most 
powerful nations. China’s population of 
1.36 billion exceeds that of industrialized 
democratic nations, and the country is 
today the world’s second largest economy 
and the largest exporter.1
However, until the late 1970s, China was 
a very poor and closed country, with an 
income per capita of just above 4% of 
the US level (Figure 1), and poorer than 
low-income countries such as India and 
Nigeria (Figure 2). The process of eco-
nomic reform, which started in the 1980s 
and accelerated in the 1990s,  catapulted 
China into a trajectory of stellar growth. 
Over the first decade of the 21st century, 
China’s GDP per capita grew at an 
annual 9.5% rate. Today, China’s GDP 
per capita is more than twice as high 
as India’s, and about four times as large 
as Nigeria’s today. Its development is 
comparable to that of Brazil, a country 
with an income about 3.5 larger than 
China in the late 1970s. 
China’s Great Convergence  
and Beyond
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5The resulting reduction in poverty is 
equally impressive: the fraction of the 
Chinese population living in extreme 
poverty plummeted from 84% in 1981 to 
13% in 2008 (Figure 3).2 Such a rapid 
improvement in living conditions for 
such a large share of the world popula-
tion is unprecedented in history. But 
while China is much richer today than 
it was thirty years ago, its income 
per capita is still less than 20% of the 
US (Figure 1).
In this paper we address three related 
questions: First, why was China so poor 
in the 1970s? Second, why was growth 
so rapid after 1979? And third, what fac-
tors can sustain and what can jeopardize 
the future growth of China?
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Between 1000 and 1500 AD, China was 
the most technologically advanced 
region worldwide. Prosperity stretched 
from the Song period (960 – 1279) to 
the commercial development under the 
Ming dynasty (1368 – 1644), when 
sea explorations led Chinese traders all 
the way to the coasts of Africa. During 
this period China introduced many 
important inventions that would become 
known in Europe only a few centuries 
later. The so-called four great inven-
tions – printing, gunpowder, paper mak-
ing and the compass – were only some 
of the major innovations introduced 
 during the Song period (or even earlier). 
Under that same dynasty, the central 
administration started issuing paper 
money, again well ahead of Europe. As 
long-distance trade with Europe devel-
oped in the 16th century, China exported 
technology-intensive goods in exchange 
for silver and primary commodities. 
The demographic evolution kept pace 
with the general prosperity: by 1100 
the Chinese population rose to over 
100 million, reaching 160 million at the 
time of the Ming dynasty.3
After the Ming splendor, power was 
seized by the Qing dynasty (1644 to 
1912 AD) – native of Manchuria. It took 
the new rulers about four decades to con-
quer the whole country and to crush the 
Ming resistance. The conflict plunged 
the country into a severe economic down-
turn. Yet, China recovered, and by the 
end of the 17th century the economy was 
flourishing again. The living standards 
in the richest Chinese city – Beijing – 
were already below those of London and 
Amsterdam in the 18th century, but 
were still comparable to those in cities 
such as Leipzig and Milan.4
The great divergence between China and 
Europe started in the 19th century. 
 Hostile to Western influence, the imperial 
government imposed heavy barriers to 
the commercial relationships with 
Europe. The ensuing conflict with the 
Western colonial powers led to a 
sequence of wars ending in military 
defeats for China (e.g., the Opium Wars 
of 1839 – 1842 and 1856 – 1860). In turn, 
these undermined severely the legitimacy 
of the imperial government. Unrest 
erupted, most notably the Taiping Rebel-
lion, an outright civil war, which brought 
the Manchurian rulers to confront surg-
ing Han nationalism between 1851 and 
1864.5 The revolt ended in bloodshed. 
Between 20 and 30 million people are 
estimated to have died as the army 
repressed the revolt with the help of the 
French and English armies.
The landmark economic event was the 
British industrial revolution. China ben-
efitted, as did Britain, from important 
technological improvements in agricul-
ture. The control of river floods caused 
a surge in food production, which in turn 
induced a demographic boom: between 
1680 and 1820, the population tripled. 
However, unlike in the West, progress 
in agriculture did not pave the way to 
industrialization and urbanization. In 
Britain these improvements preluded the 
breakdown of the Malthusian equilib-
rium. Fertility started to decline and 
income per capita to grow. China, in con-
trast, remained a rural country, with a 
stagnating income per capita.
Historical Background
Imperial China
7The divergence accelerated when Chinese 
political institutions collapsed in the early 
20th century. A revolution in 1911 led to 
the proclamation of the republic under 
the presidency of Sun Yat-sen. However, 
the new state was weak and precipitated 
into a period of wars and anarchy.
In 1949, after the end of the Sino-Japa-
nese war, the communist uprising, and 
the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalis-
tic forces, the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) was founded under the leadership 
of Mao Zedong, chairman of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP thereafter). The 
PRC was a vastly impoverished country, 
dominated by traditional subsistence 
activities. From 1951 and onward, indus-
try and agriculture were collectivized. 
Dissatisfied with the slow speed of prog-
ress, Mao launched in 1956 the “Hun-
dred Flowers Campaign” inviting 
intellectuals and ordinary people to voice 
their open criticism of the Party’s policies 
and bureaucracy. This window for open 
debate was soon closed, and replaced 
by the call for a “Great Leap Forward”, 
an ambitious (and improvised) plan 
intended to turn the People’s Republic 
into a modern industrial collectivized 
country. Its implementation contributed 
to the ensuing famine that killed about 
30 million people.6 After an ephemeral 
reform-oriented stage under the aegis of 
Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (1962 –  
1964) a new wave of radicalism erupted 
with the start of the “Cultural Revolu-
tion”, which was  supposed to cleanse 
the society of capitalism and traditional 
 Chinese values. During this tormented 
period, Liu  Shaoqi was jailed and died in 
prison, while Deng Xiaoping fell into 
 disgrace. 
After Mao’s death in 1976 and the 
 liquidation of the “Gang of Four” – a 
group of leftist party officials, including 
Mao’s wife – Deng Xiaoping became 
the de-facto leader of the Communist 
Party. He quickly repudiated the Cultural 
 Revolution, and in 1978 launched a 
 program of pragmatic economic reforms 
whose primary goal was to increase the 
persistent low productivity in agriculture.7
The four leaders of China in the 20th century
Sun Yat-sen 
1866 – 1925
Deng Xiaoping 
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Mao Zedong 
1893 – 1976
Chiang Kai-shek 
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After thirty years of central planning, 
China gradually adopted a set of market-
oriented reforms. Land collectivization 
was replaced by the principle of “house-
hold responsibility” in agriculture, 
while the role of local governments was 
enhanced by the creation of township 
and village enterprises. The government 
experimented with a new industrial 
 policy granting a special status to a few 
selected  Special Economic Zones (SEZ). 
The decade marked the start of a rapid 
structural transformation from agricul-
ture to industry and services: between 
1978 and 2003 the employment share of 
agriculture fell from over 70 percent to 
less than 50 percent.
SEZ were especially important. They 
received preferential treatment in terms 
of tax deduction, custom duty deduction, 
reduced land-use price, and flexibility 
in labor and financial contracts. SEZ 
opened a hitherto isolated economy to 
foreign investments and the associated 
flow of technical knowledge. Initially, 
four SEZ were established: Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai and Shantou in the Guangdong 
Province and Xiamen in the Fujian 
 Province. The success of the experiment 
led to a progressive expansion of Chinese 
industrial policy: in 1984 fourteen cities 
on the East Coast, and later two prov-
inces and three delta areas became SEZ. 
Then, in 1992, 1998 and 2005 the SEZ 
status was extended to inland cities; 
first capitals, then median cities.
A recent empirical study tried to quantify 
the effects of SEZ on the economic devel-
opment of China. The establishment of 
SEZ was staggered over time and space. 
The study exploits this variation across 
276 Chinese cities over the period 1988 – 
2010 to estimate econometrically the 
effect of the industrial policy. Their main 
finding is that becoming a SEZ increases 
the city’s GDP per capita by 20% after 
fifteen years, suggesting that the indus-
trial policy indeed was effective in pro-
moting economic development. SEZ 
were also important as their experiment 
strengthened the confidence of the politi-
cal leadership that opening the Chinese 
economy to markets and trade was 
 essential to achieve industrialization and 
economic development.8
In summary, the 1980s were an impor-
tant decade of experimentation in eco-
nomic reform. Development took off as 
productivity in agriculture soared and 
domestic and foreign investments 
poured into the SEZ. Nevertheless, most 
of the country remained subject to a 
 centralized  planning system. By the end 
of the decade, growth slowed down 
and popular discontent grew as wide-
spread corruption within the political 
elite was exposed. Street demonstrations 
after the death of the reformist leader 
Hu Yaobang in 1987 were followed two 
years later by the  student protest, vio-
lently repressed, in Tiananmen Square. 
Divisions fermented within the Commu-
The Great Convergence
The 1980s: experimenting with  
economic reforms
9nist Party as its conservative faction chal-
lenged the whole process of economic 
reform.
The early 
The 1990s: China 
becomes a market 
economy
1990s were marked by great 
uncertainty. Eventually, the pro-reform 
faction won, and the reform process 
resumed. The turning point was Deng 
Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour” of 1992 – a 
series of informal speeches laying out the 
Party’s new course and gathering  support 
for deeper economic reforms that would 
transform China irreversibly. In 1992, the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange re-opened. 
State-owned enterprises (SOE thereafter) 
were subjected to market competition 
with inefficient and unprofitable entities 
forced to either restructure or shut down. 
Many SOE were privatized or formed 
joint ventures with foreign firms. Wholly 
private enterprises owned by Chinese 
entrepreneurs were created and received 
the official blessing of the CCP in 1997. 
China embraced a process of export-led 
growth, culminating in accession to the 
World Trade Organization in 2001. It is 
often argued that the growth in the 1990s 
was largely investment-driven. Indeed, 
investment rates were sustained at a very 
high level, well over 30%. However, the 
economic transformation was more than 
mere capital accumulation: it brought 
about major changes in the  sectoral com-
position of output, urbanization, and a 
growing importance of markets, technol-
ogy adoption and entrepreneurial skills. If 
part of China’s success can be explained 
by the adoption of new technologies from 
existing firms, reallocation has been a key 
driver of the growth process. Recent stud-
ies document that up to two-thirds of the 
aggregate productivity growth in manu-
facturing was due to selection, i.e., high-
productivity firms entering and low 
productivity firms exiting the market.
The lion’s share of this reallocation pro-
cess is the exit of low-productivity state-
owned enterprises (SOE) and their 
replacement with new domestic private 
enterprises (DPE). Figure 4 shows the pri-
vate employment share in manufacturing, 
mining and construction, including both 
domestic private enterprises and foreign-
owned enterprises.9 In 1994, private enter-
prises accounted for about 10% of total 
employment. By 2007, their share 
exceeded 50%. A number of empirical 
studies document that SOE are, on aver-
age, significantly less productive than 
DPE. Thus, the process of reallocation is 
related intimately to the progressive pri-
vatization of the Chinese economy.
Another salient feature of the Chinese 
transition is the low wage growth. The 
average real annual growth of wages in 
the urban manufacturing sector was 7.6% 
from 1992 to 2007, whereas the average 
growth rate in the urban real GDP per 
capita during the same period was above 
10%. Moreover, part of the measured 
wage growth stems from a composition 
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Fig. 4  Employment share of domestic private enterprises (DPE) 
in manufacturing, mining and construction
In %
DPE/(DPE+SOE), in NBS
NBS = National Business Survey FE = Foreign Enterprises
(DPE+FE)/Total, in NBS; adds employment in 
foreign-owned firms to DPE
Source: China Statistical Yearbook
10
UBS Center Public Paper China’s Great Convergence and Beyond
effect as the share of educated workers 
has risen. There is also evidence of a 
 falling labor share of aggregate output, 
from 50% in 1992 to 41% in 2005. The 
moderate wage growth, combined with 
the economic success of a thriving class 
of new entrepreneurs, has contributed to 
the rising inequality in China.
Finally, China was (and is) characterized 
by pervasive credit and financial market 
imperfections. A symptom of these imper-
fections is the large gap between high 
 corporate returns and very low returns on 
savings: the average real rate of return on 
bank deposits, the main financial invest-
ment of Chinese households, was close to 
zero. Firms are credit constrained, and 
 private firms more so than SOE. The dis-
crimination against private enterprises is 
reflected in the evidence that DPE finance 
a substantially smaller share of their 
new investments through external chan-
nels (bank loans or equity).10
In one of our recent studies11, we propose 
a theory consistent with the empirical 
 regularities outlined above: high output 
growth,  sustained returns on capital 
investment, an extensive reallocation 
within the manufacturing sector, and a 
falling labor share. The  building blocks 
of the theory are financial imperfections 
and differences in productivity across 
firms. Some (mostly privately owned) 
firms use more productive technologies, 
but less productive (mostly state-owned) 
firms survive because of a better access to 
credit markets. Due to credit constraints, 
private firms must be financed out of 
internal  savings. If these savings are suffi-
ciently large, the high-productivity pri-
vate firms outgrow the low-productivity 
state-owned firms and attract an increas-
ing employment share. This reallocation 
is a source of productivity growth at the 
aggregate level.
Figure 5 sketches the mechanics of the 
model used in that study. Banks collect 
resources by offering households deposit 
“Growing like China”
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accounts. On the liability side of their 
balance sheets, they have loans to domes-
tic firms and foreign bonds.12 However, 
as the figure emphasizes graphically, 
banks do not lend to DPE. Thus, the 
growth of DPE hinges on the personal 
savings and investments of their owners 
(entrepreneurs).13 Since DPE are more 
productive, absent credit market imper-
fections, banks should instead lend 
mostly to DPE. If this had occurred, DPE 
would have swiftly pushed the SOE out 
of the market. So, credit market frictions 
guarantee the survival of bad firms. In 
addition, they originate a “saving glut” 
that feeds the accumulation of foreign 
reserves. As the figure hints, in 1997, 
the economy was dominated by SOE, 
with only a small share of workers 
employed by DPE. At the time, the for-
eign surplus is small. However, thanks 
to their higher productivity, DPE grew 
faster than did SOE. Thus, the demand 
of loans from SOE shrank over time, 
whereas savings continued to grow. Hence, 
the saving glut: the downsizing of the 
state-owned firms forced a growing share 
of domestic savings to be invested in 
 foreign assets, generating a booming 
accumulation of foreign reserves. We will 
return to this issue in the following sec-
tion below.
Figure 5 describes the mechanics of the 
Chinese economic transition. However, 
what was the trigger of the transition? 
Part of the answer lies in the industrial 
policies started in the 1980s and expanded 
throughout the 1990s, such as the SEZ 
discussed above. Another important 
 policy change was the new strategy laid 
out by the Ninth Five-Year Plan in 1997, 
which gave the official green light to 
privatization. The new strategy also spec-
ified the limits to privatization, by requir-
ing that a strong state presence should 
be retained in some key sectors. In those 
industries, the  system of SOE should 
be rationalized rather than let die. The 
slogan was “Grab the large and release 
the small firm”.
The data confirm that 1997 was a turn-
ing point. Since then, the role of SOE 
has declined substantially in many sec-
tors, especially labor-intensive ones, while 
it has remained dominant in other more 
capital-intensive industries (e.g., electrical 
and heating power or transport equip-
ment). In these industries, the government 
promoted the merger and restructuring of 
SOE into large transregional groups. Sur-
viving SOE enjoyed rising profits. This is 
due in part to productivity improvements 
within surviving SOE and in part to the 
“survival of the fittest”: the least produc-
tive SOE exited the market or were 
forced to merge or restructure, whereas 
the most productive (typically, large) SOE 
continued and expanded their activity. 
In many instances, the increasing profit-
ability of surviving SOE is due to increas-
ing monopoly power. These firms did not 
only remain dominant in their industries, 
but also benefit from the increased 
 efficiency of the rest of the manufactur-
ing industries which were liberalized.14
Fig. 5  “Growing Like China”
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High growth in China has been accom-
panied by a persistent trade surplus 
 (Figure 6) and the accumulation of for-
eign reserves which swelled from USD 21 
billion in 1992 (5% of its GDP) to 
USD 3500 billion in June 2013 (over 
40% of its GDP), see Figure 7. 
The recent literature has noted that this 
is a common feature to other fast-grow-
ing emerging economies (though there 
are exceptions, such as India). These 
economies have a large foreign surplus, in 
spite of the higher return on investments 
enjoyed by local firms relative to the rest 
of the world.15 While China is not unique 
in this respect, it is the largest exporting 
nation. Thus, the Chinese foreign surplus 
has been the object of far greater public 
attention than any other country’s in 
recent years. A concern is that cheap Chi-
nese exports harm domestic firms and 
cause job losses in the West, in line with 
the evidence for the US.16
A popular argument is that trade sur-
pluses are engineered by the Chinese gov-
ernment through a systematic exchange 
rate manipulation, i.e., by pegging the 
RMB to the dollar at a low value. This 
view has dubious foundations. While the 
Chinese surplus has persisted for almost 
two decades, after a period of mild depre-
ciation, the real exchange rate has been 
appreciating since 2003.17 A misaligned 
exchange rate should feed domestic infla-
tion, e.g., by increasing the demand of 
non-traded goods and stimulating domes-
tic wage pressure. However, until very 
recently it does not appear as if China 
has experienced any major inflationary 
pressure – between 1997 and 2007 the 
inflation rate was on average about the 
same as in the US.
We provide an alternative, structural 
explanation for the imbalance.18 This 
explanation is consistent with the evi-
dence in Figure 7 that the difference 
between total deposit and loans tracks 
very closely the accumulation of foreign 
reserves. This is consistent with the 
 saving glut explanation outlined in the 
previous section. To see the same point 
from a different angle it is useful to 
 consider the macroeconomics identity 
according to which the trade surplus 
equals the gap between domestic savings 
and investments. During the last fifteen 
years, China has experienced large 
 investment rates, but even larger saving 
rates. Since 1997 domestic savings have 
exceeded domestic investments (Fig-
ure 8). To understand better what has 
happened, it is useful to decompose the 
savings gap between the household, 
 corporate, and government sectors, see 
Figure 9. As can be expected, households 
are net suppliers of savings, while firms 
demand external resources to finance 
investments. The net position of the 
households (i.e., the gap between house-
holds’ savings and investments) has 
The foreign surplus
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increased slightly between 1992 and 
2009.19 In contrast, the net demand of 
external funds from firms, i.e., corporate 
investments minus savings, has been 
declining sharply as a share of the GDP 
since 1992. This means that the corporate 
sector has been financing a larger and 
larger share of their investments through 
retained earnings and less from house-
hold savings (which must be mediated 
through the financial sector). The govern-
ment played a less important role in 
accounting for the aggregate savings gap. 
In summary, the gap between households’ 
savings and investment has increased 
over time, while the demand of funds of 
domestic firms has fallen, arguably due to 
the Chinese banks’ reluctance to finance 
the growing private firms. The result is a 
large gap between savings and invest-
ment, implying a large current account 
surplus. The exchange rate of the RMB 
plays no explicit role in this explanation.20
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Fig. 7  Foreign reserves and gap between deposits and loans
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Fig. 8  Aggregate savings and investment in China: 1992–2009
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China’s massive foreign surplus points to 
another puzzling aspect of China’s trans-
formation: its huge propensity to save. 
The aggregate saving rate has been above 
35% of GDP since the 1980s, and has 
risen further after 2000, exceeding 50% 
in recent years. Household savings as a 
fraction of disposable income has 
increased from 16% in 1990 to over 30% 
nowadays. This is a much higher propen-
sity to save than in any industrialized 
nation. 
Why have Chinese households saved so 
much, given the fast income growth 
observed since the 1980s? A lot of recent 
research has attempted to answer this 
question. In a recent study, Marcos 
Chamon and Eswar Prasad document a 
large increase in saving rates for all 
cohorts and age groups, especially the 
young and the elderly.21 They argue that 
a key driver of high savings is the shifting 
burden of health and education expendi-
tures from the state to individuals, a 
change that has induced young house-
holds to save for their children’s educa-
tion, and elderly households to save for 
retirement and health care needs. The end 
of the so-called “iron rice bowl” had a 
particularly large effect on the savings of 
the generations more directly affected by 
the reforms – i.e., those who were in their 
40s and 50s in 1990. Other researchers 
argue that the large-scale privatization of 
houses, which triggered an increase in the 
ownership rate from 17% in 1990 to 
86% in 2005, played an important role. 
Namely, the reform increased house 
prices and the number of potential buy-
ers. Given the down-payment constraints 
and financial frictions, the savings had to 
increase.22
Yet other authors argue that savings rates 
in China may be high because of precau-
tionary motives. They document that 
Chinese households face more severe 
income uncertainty than do US house-
holds, and hence save more.23 A concern 
with this explanation is that while house-
hold saving rose sharply after 2000 (see 
Figures 8 and 9), it is difficult to point 
to a large empirical increase in individual 
risk during this period. For instance, 
 pension coverage increased over that 
decade.
An important policy change that may 
have affected saving behavior is the 
sequence of family planning policies 
introduced in the 1970s, culminating 
with the 1979 one-child policy. This pol-
icy imposes draconian sanctions on 
urban couples who have more than one 
child and rural couples who have more 
than two children – with exemptions for 
 special groups and ethnic minorities. As a 
consequence, the total fertility rate (TFR) 
fell sharply. For instance, in urban areas, 
the number of surviving children fell 
from 3.2 in 1970 to less than 1.3 in 
The savings puzzle
“The one-child policy may have increased savings since 
it reduced the number of children who can potentially 
provide old-age transfers when parents retire.”
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1982. Recent studies argue that the pol-
icy’s introduction may have increased 
 savings since it reduced the number of 
children who can potentially provide old-
age transfers when parents retire.
Among them, Abhijit Banerjee and his 
 co-authors’ study looks at the effect 
of the family planning policies introduced 
in 1972 under Chairman Mao on the 
savings behavior of today’s retirees.24 
These policies encouraged an increase in 
birth spacing of three to four years. The 
researchers find that families subject to 
family planning policy have a saving rate 
5.7 percentage points higher than those 
not affected. The difference is almost 
entirely accounted for by families whose 
first child is a daughter born in 1972 or 
later. For these families saving rates 
increased by 9.7 percentage points, 
whereas there is no  significant effect of 
the 1972 family-planning policies on 
families whose first child is a son. They 
relate this finding to the Chinese tradi-
tion that sons provide more support to 
elder parents than do daughters. Thus, 
the policy had its strongest effect on the 
savings of families who had a daughter 
and were unexpectedly barred from hav-
ing another child. These couples could 
not expect much help from their child, 
and therefore save more for retirement. 
Another recent study documents similar 
effects of the one-child policy on house-
holds with dependent children.25
Looking at a different channel, Shang-
Jin Wei and Xiaobo Zhang argue that 
the increase in savings is related to the 
growing sex imbalance at birth. The sex 
ratio – i.e., the number of men per 
woman – has increased dramatically over 
the last three decades in China, from 
106 boys for 100 girls in 1980 to 120 
boys per 100 girls in 2005. This is due to 
the joint effects of the one-child policy, 
the traditional preference for a male off-
spring, and the access to selective abor-
tion technology. These changes stiffened 
the competition among boys in the 
 marriage market. They argue that, in 
response, households with a son will 
increase their savings in order to make 
their boys more competitive in the 
 marriage market. In support of this the-
ory, they document that households 
with a son have a higher average propen-
sity to save than households with a 
daughter. Moreover, the savings of house-
holds with a son increased more in regions 
with a greater sex imbalance. Finally, 
 saving rates tend to be higher in regions 
and years with a greater local sex imbal-
ance.26
The studies reviewed above suggest that 
demographic changes can be important 
for savings. However, changes in fertility 
may have different effects on savings at 
different stages of the life cycle. Due to 
data limitations, we do not yet know 
how the one-child policy will eventually 
affect savings for all age groups.
Sources: OECD; IMF
Saving rates, percentage 
of disposable household 
income
Save, save, 
save …
30
10.3
China
Germany
United States
Japan
3.9
0.8
16
UBS Center Public Paper China’s Great Convergence and Beyond
What does the future bode? A common 
view in the West is that China’s growth 
trajectory is unsustainable, due to the 
persistence of a  nondemocratic institu-
tional framework, different from those 
that promoted prosperity in the West. 
The extractive Chinese institutions – it 
is argued – can possibly sustain catch-up 
at an early stage of development, but will 
eventually become a burden and China 
will be caught in the “middle-income 
trap”.27 Others argue that China’s hybrid 
form of “state capitalism” can become a 
successful new model of economic 
growth, possibly exportable to other 
developing nations. Due of the lack of 
historical precedents, this debate is 
 necessarily speculative.
In light of the recent economic literature, 
this section reviews factors influencing 
China’s future economic development. 
We start with some impetuses, then dis-
cuss some obstacles.
The 
Impetus for sus-
tained growth: R&D 
and human-capital 
accumulation
mere adoption of technologies 
already in use abroad is likely to be a 
powerful engine of growth for at least 
another decade. China is still a relatively 
poor country, with an average productiv-
ity of firms and workers far below that 
of industrialized nations. Therefore, the 
potential for technological catch-up is 
still enormous. To draw a comparison, in 
2010 the GDP per capita of Russia was 
more than twice that of China. Given the 
current rates of productivity growth and 
fast technology adoption, it seems 
unlikely that China’s institutions could 
prevent it from reaching Russia’s current 
level of development.
Perhaps more important, China is trans-
forming itself into an innovation-oriented 
economy. Foreign direct investments have 
been a major driver of technology trans-
fer.28 In addition, China has also invested 
large resources to develop a strong local 
innovation capability. The R&D invest-
ment share of GDP has increased steeply, 
from 0.7% in the 1990s to 1.84% in 
2011. Today’s figure is close to the aver-
age for the European Union (1.94%), 
although still lower than that of the 
United States, Germany and Switzerland 
 (Figure 10). China has already surpassed 
rich economies such as Canada, Italy, 
Spain and the UK, and spends substan-
tially more on R&D than do other 
emerging economies. The comparison is 
even more impressive if one restricts 
attention to industry-related R&D invest-
ments: China invests 1.36% compared 
with 1.66% of the US and 1.02% of the 
EU. Finally, looking at the number of pat-
ents in 2011, the Chinese patent office 
granted 172,000 patents, compared with 
225,000 and 152,000 patents granted 
respectively by the US Patent and Trade-
mark Office and the European Patent 
Office. In summary, China is a very inno-
vative economy, far ahead other countries 
at a comparable development stage. 
 Economic theories highlighting the risk 
of middle-income traps emphasize the 
inability for countries with rigid institu-
tions to promote a transition from an 
investment-driven to an innovation-
The Future of China
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driven growth.29 There is no evidence so 
far indicating that China is getting stuck 
into a low-innovation equilibrium.
Next, China is making large human-capi-
tal investments. The average years of edu-
cation in the population over 25 are now 
7.5, twice as high as in 1980.30 Assuming 
a rate of return to education of, say, 10% 
per year, this increase in educational 
attainment implies an increase in average 
labor productivity of 43% due to human-
capital accumulation alone. The increase 
in the proportion of the population with 
some tertiary education is even faster: 
6% today against 1% in 1980. The cur-
rent enrollment rate in tertiary education 
(27%, according to World Bank 2013) 
implies steep increases in future educa-
tional attainment. The boom in higher 
education is a recent phenomenon: 
between 1979 and 1995, tertiary school 
enrollment rates were below 2.5%, and 
the increasing shortage of high-skill 
workers was reflected in a rapid rise in 
the return to education.31 This trend was 
followed by a rapid expansion in higher 
education during the last decade, bring-
ing the number of fresh college graduates 
from less than a million in 2001 to over 
six million in 2010. This was accompa-
nied by a booming number of students 
studying overseas: Chinese students rep-
resent today 18.2% of all international 
students enrolled in OECD countries.32 
Changes in the quantity of education 
likely underestimate the actual human-
capital accumulation. During pre-reform 
times – especially during the cultural rev-
olution – schools at all levels emphasized 
ideological learning. In all likelihood the 
market values this knowledge lower than 
it values the skills students obtain in the 
current schooling system. In 2009, Shang-
hai came out as the leader in the PISA 
study, outperforming by a wide margin 
Western countries. Interestingly, Shanghai 
students’ scores were far less correlated 
with their socioeconomic background 
than in OECD countries. Thus, schools 
appear to be a vehicle of social mobility 
in China.
Human-capital accumulation, invest-
ments in technology adoption and indus-
trial policies (such as Special Economic 
Zones) have come hand in hand with an 
increasing technology intensity of indus-
“The potential for technological catch-up is still enor-
mous. The mere adoption of technologies already  
in use abroad is likely to be a powerful engine of growth 
for at least another decade.”
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trial production. Over the last decade 
China has become increasingly less spe-
cialized in labor-intensive and low value-
added industries (e.g., textiles), shifting 
its production and export structure 
towards high-tech sectors.
Finally, an important, yet largely unex-
ploited potential source of future growth 
is the reduction of the pervasive financial 
frictions. As discussed above, these are 
responsible for severe misallocations. 
Thus, reforms aimed at reducing the mar-
ket power of the large state banks, for 
instance by allowing banks to compete in 
offering deposit and lending rates (so far 
heavily regulated), and at improving the 
legal system (contract enforcement, inves-
tor protection, etc.) can have large effects 
on productivity.33 The opening of the 
capital account and the convertibility of 
the RMB, currently under discussion, are 
an opportunity for such reforms.
Despite 
Inequality, aging 
population and 
pension system
China’s potential promise, there 
are looming issues that could potentially 
stall the reform process and threaten the 
future economic development. We discuss 
here four salient factors: the rising eco-
nomic inequality; the aging population; 
the environmental toll of rapid economic 
growth and its negative impact on quality 
of life; and the fragility of the political 
equilibrium.
Economic inequality and the aging of the 
population are perhaps the most acute 
challenges to social cohesion and the sta-
tus quo in China. Fast growth has been 
accompanied by a rapid increase of 
income inequality. Starting poor but 
equal, China has evolved into a highly 
unequal society. The Gini coefficient of 
income has risen from 0.36 in 1992 to 
0.47 in 2012, roughly comparable to that 
of the US, and much higher than that 
of any Western European country. The 
top 10% income share rose from 19% to 
28% between 1990 and 2003. The 
sources of increasing inequality are mani-
fold: age (i.e., younger cohorts are much 
richer than older ones), education, disper-
sion across regions and between rural 
and urban areas, resident and non-resi-
dent workers, capitalists and workers, 
etc. To the extent that a continued reform 
process – the status quo – requires social 
cohesion, the growing disparities pose 
a real risk. In absolute terms, growth has 
benefitted both the rich and the poor. 
As discussed above, the poverty rates 
have fallen dramatically after 1980. Over 
the same period, life expectancy has risen 
by approximately 10 percentage points, 
reaching 74 years in 2011. But while 
growth has benefitted the Chinese popu-
lation overall, inequality may pose a 
threat to social cohesion, and has become 
increasingly salient in the discourse of the 
political leadership. In a 2012 press con-
ference, the former premier of the State 
Council Wen Jiabao declared: “I know 
that social inequities … have caused the 
dissatisfaction of the masses. We must 
push forward the work on promoting 
social equity … The first issue is the over-
all development of the reform of the 
income distribution system.”
The looming aging of the population is 
another such critical issue. The total 
dependency ratio has fallen from 75% in 
1975 to just 37% in 2010. This is due to 
the combination of high fertility in the 
1960s – when China’s total fertility rate 
(TFR, henceforth) was between five and 
six – and the family planning policies 
introduced in the 1970s,  culminating with 
the one-child policy. As a result, a very 
large share of the Chinese population is of 
working age today. The expanding share 
of working people has contributed to eco-
nomic growth in the two past decades. 
However, China has now reached a turn-
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ing point: the old-age dependency ratio 
will increase from the current 12% to 
39% in 2040. Figure 11 shows the evolu-
tion of the dependency ratio (i.e., the ratio 
between the number of people not in 
working age – children and elderly – and 
the number of people in working age) for 
China, India and the United States. The 
increase of the dependency ratio in China 
is faster than that in the US. India, in con-
trast, has a declining dependency ratio 
until 2040, due to its higher current fertil-
ity. The Chinese increasing trend is likely 
to continue well beyond 2040, since the 
current TFR (estimated to be around 1.6) 
is below the replacement level. Even if the 
one-child policy were relaxed, it is unclear 
to what extent this would increase the 
TFR, at least in urban areas. For instance, 
other emerging economies that are today 
richer than China, such as  Brazil and Rus-
sia, have low TFR (equal to 1.8 and 1.7, 
respectively). Regions culturally similar to 
mainland China, such as Hong Kong, 
 Taiwan, Macau and Singapore have TFR 
of 1.2 or lower.
Some commentators warn that an aging 
population might harm economic 
growth, pointing to the experience of 
Japan: future saving rates may decline 
(though this is unlikely to be a major 
issue for China); the society may turn less 
forward-looking and innovative; and, 
most importantly, the government’s 
future tax base and, hence, its ability to 
finance social policies, will be compro-
mised. Thus, an aging population will 
make it increasingly difficult to mitigate 
China’s income disparities.
In no setting is the dual challenge of 
inequality and aging more evident than in 
China’s pension system. Historically, 
 pension systems have been a powerful 
vehicle of intergenerational redistribution 
in Western economies, and this “social 
contract” has been a force for social 
cohesion. Its introduction bailed out the 
unlucky generations that were hit by 
the Great Depression and World War II. 
Arguably, a similar case can be made for 
the current elderly Chinese workers 
who were impoverished by the tragic 
experiences of the Great Famine and the 
Cultural Revolution. Indeed, intergenera-
tional inequality is a very important part 
of total inequality in China. Due to high 
growth, the present value of earnings for 
a worker entering the labor force in 2000 
is, on average, about six times as large as 
“Economic inequality and the aging of the population 
are perhaps the most acute challenges to  
social cohesion and the status quo in China.”
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that of a worker who entered in 1970.34 
Poverty among the elderly is a major 
social issue, especially in rural areas. One 
might object that the elderly can be 
bailed out by their own children. How-
ever, the traditional family insurance 
 system relying on transfers and support 
from children (especially, sons) is under 
strain, due to the smaller number of chil-
dren, increasing geographic mobility, and 
the decline of traditional values.35 In this 
context, pension transfers seem critical 
for mitigating inequality and poverty.
Given these issues, it is natural that the 
pension system is a key policy issue for 
China. We now review China’s current 
pension system, and then analyze how it 
should be changed, in light of our preced-
ing discussion on inequality and aging.
China has an urban pension system, 
 originally introduced in 1986 and then 
reformed in 1997. Rural residents earn 
no pensions, although a limited rural 
pension system has been introduced 
recently. Prior to 1986, urban firms were 
committed to paying pensions to their 
retired employees. This system ceased to 
be viable in a market economy with firm 
and worker turnover. The 1986 reform 
transferred responsibility for pensions to 
local municipalities. However, private 
firms were typically evading contribu-
tions, and many urban workers did not 
accumulate pension rights. Municipalities 
came under financial distress and had 
to be bailed out by the central govern-
ment. The 1997 reform reduced the 
 generosity of pensions, and strengthened 
the enforcement of contribution. Subse-
quently, the coverage of the system has 
now risen from 44% in 1992 to over 
60% today. However, the current system 
is not financially sustainable. In one 
of our recent studies we find that given 
the demographic outlook of China, the 
present value of the future contributions 
falls short of the present value of the 
promised pension payments. We estimate 
that if one were to achieve sustainability 
by adjusting the replacement rate as of 
2013, a permanent cut from the current 
60% to 40% would be required.
However, we argue that an immediate 
adjustment is not desirable from a social 
welfare perspective. Even a society plac-
ing a very high weight on future genera-
tions should defer the reform until, at 
least, year 2040. The reason is that future 
wages can be expected to be very high 
compared to the current wages, so large 
sacrifices by today’s workers and retirees 
will amount to very little in comparison 
to the future wages. Note that a generous 
pension system today bails out the cur-
rent generations of poor old workers and 
retirees, by transferring to them resources 
that would  otherwise accrue to richer 
future generations. Even though delaying 
the (necessary) pension reform will cost 
the future generations in terms of even 
lower pensions, these generations will 
have very high wages and can save for 
their old age at a low cost. For the same 
reason, the analysis shows that even 
a reform that would replace the current 
system with a fully-funded system – 
 similar to the Chilean reform of 1980 – 
would not be advisable, due the high 
social costs for the poorer early genera-
tions. We also analyze the welfare impli-
cations of turning the Chinese pension 
system into a universal system, pooling 
all Chinese workers and retirees – in both 
rural and urban areas – into one common 
pension system. We find that this could 
lead to large  welfare gains, at only a 
modest cost for the future generations.36
These normative predictions run against 
the popular argument among economists 
that reforming the pension system in a 
 pre-funded direction is the appropriate 
response for emerging economies with an 
aging population but are instead broadly 
in line with recent policy recommendations 
by Nicholas Barr and Peter Diamond.37
Our study mentioned above provides a 
rationale for using a temporarily unbal-
anced pension system to bail out the poor 
generations that are currently middle-
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aged and older. This can be a vehicle 
of social cohesion in China, especially if 
it is extended to cover all Chinese citi-
zens. Carrying out an immediate fiscal 
 consolidation of the pension system 
would require substantial government 
savings today to finance future transfers. 
Given the large wealth that China has 
already amassed (e.g., in the form of 
 foreign reserves), this does not seem a top 
priority. To the opposite, this wealth 
could be used to finance policies and 
institutions aimed at reducing inequality 
and making the growth process more 
inclusive. As China develops, the citizens’ 
demand for more extensive welfare 
 policies is likely to grow. A large share of 
citizens, such as the rural and the non-
resident migrant population, can be 
expected to seek access to social insur-
ance from which they have been largely 
excluded in the past.
One of the 
The environmental 
disaster: pollution  
for promotion
big open questions for China 
is the bias of its growth process towards 
quantity relative to quality. Environmen-
tal degradation casts a shadow over 
China. A New York Times article read: 
“Chinese cities often seem wrapped in a 
toxic gray shroud. Only 1 percent of the 
country’s 560 million city dwellers 
breathe air considered safe by the Euro-
pean Union.”38 Medium-size cities such 
as Linfen and Tianying lead the sad rank-
ing of the most polluted cities worldwide, 
due to coal and heavy metals contamina-
tion, respectively. Water pollution is an 
equally severe problem. China relies on 
dirty technologies to a larger extent than 
do other countries of a similar develop-
ment level. Why has the problem grown 
so rampant?
According to Ruixue Jia the answer lies 
in the system of promotion incentives 
within the Chinese Communist Party that 
induces local political leaders to disre-
gard environmental considerations in 
order to achieve maximum growth. The 
promotion of provincial governors wish-
ing to climb the Party’s hierarchy ladder 
hinges on the growth performance of 
their province. This inhibits politicians 
from taking or enforcing measures that 
would limit the use of cheap polluting 
technologies.
Jia shows that when a provincial gover-
nor stands a serious chance of promo-
tion, he tends to disregard environmental 
concerns. In other word, if a career 
opportunity opens up to a provincial 
leader, his region will experience an 
increase in both the use of dirty technolo-
gies and economic growth. She focuses 
on the connections between provincial 
governors and members of the Politburo 
Standing Committee, who are responsible 
for the promotion of provincial gover-
nors to higher positions within the 
 Communist Party. She assumes that a 
governor and a Standing Committee 
member are connected whenever they 
either were work colleagues, studied at 
the same university, or originate from 
the same province. She estimates how the 
performance at the provincial level 
changes when a politician to which the 
provincial leader is connected ascends to 
the Politburo Standing Committee. She 
finds that when a governor becomes 
 connected, industrial growth increases in 
his province relative to the rest of China. 
However, the environmental toll is heavy: 
both water contamination from indus-
trial waste and air pollutant emissions 
increase, respectively, by about 25% and 
10%.39
Jia’s findings support the hypothesis that 
career concerns explain why China is so 
heavily polluted today. This suggests that 
political reforms should focus not only 
on passing new laws and financing pro-
grams to stop the environmental degra-
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dation, but also on changing the informal 
rules and incentives within the Commu-
nist Party – establishing good environ-
mental standards as an explicit measure 
of political success. Another implication 
is that a more environmentally balanced 
approach may require some sacrifice 
in terms of growth rates. If such policy 
changes can avert environmental disas-
ters, they may improve welfare for mil-
lions of people.
Political 
State capitalism 
and political 
 reforms
incentives also are at the core of 
another topical question: Will economic 
growth bring about democratization or 
will the current political system be resil-
ient to changes? If so, will political dis-
tortions curtail economic development?
In a recent study conducted at the Uni-
versity of Zurich, Yikai Wang addresses 
these  important questions by proposing 
and testing a game-theoretic model of 
state capitalism where a self-interested 
political elite controls state-owned enter-
prises and can impose taxes on private 
firms. To stay in power the elite must 
shore up sufficient political support to 
avert a democratic revolution. It achieves 
this goal through a divide-and-rule strat-
egy that involves distorting the economic 
equilibrium so as to grant sufficient 
 privileges to its supporters. 
More precisely, the elite distorts the mar-
ket equilibrium by creating a dual labor 
market where the employees of the state 
sector enjoy a wage premium that turns 
them into supporters of the nondemo-
cratic system. In  contrast, the wage paid 
by private firms is determined by com-
petitive market forces. Under democracy, 
all workers can influence the outcome of 
the political process. Thus, in a demo-
cratic regime, taxes are imposed on all 
firms and the tax revenue is distributed 
back to citizens as social transfers. 
 Workers can decide either to support the 
existing political regime or to engage in 
a revolution. To avoid a democratic 
 revolution, the elite must secure that two 
conditions are satisfied. First, the share 
of workers employed by state-owned 
enterprises must be sufficiently large to 
ensure that the status quo has enough 
popular support. Second, state workers 
must indeed be willing to support the 
regime: namely, they must earn a suffi-
ciently high wage to prefer the status quo 
to democratization.
Wang’s study rationalizes the puzzling 
observation that the middle class – 
regarded in many countries as the driv-
ing force of democratization – appears 
to support the nondemocratic system 
in China. In his theory, the middle class 
comprises state sector employees and 
entrepreneurs. The latter thrive because 
under state capitalism they can hire 
workers at a lower wage than they 
“The middle class – regarded in many countries  
as the driving force of democratization – appears 
to support the nondemocratic system in China.” 
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would in an undistorted market econ-
omy with democratic institutions. 
Empirical studies document that state 
sector employees indeed earn a signifi-
cant wage premium relative to workers 
employed in the private sector. More-
over, survey evidence indicates that state 
sector employees are on average less 
 supportive of democratic values than 
other social groups, consistent with 
the view that they are an important base 
of support for the regime. Interestingly, 
in China the employment status (state 
or private sector) is a stronger predictor 
of the attitude towards democracy than 
that of party membership. This evidence 
is consistent with the predictions of 
Wang’s theory.40
What is the effect of state capitalism on 
growth? At the early stage of the transi-
tion process, state capitalism can actually 
speed up growth by reducing wages and 
favoring investments in the private sector. 
However, as the country becomes more 
developed, the survival of state capitalism 
requires heavier and heavier distortions 
to prevent the employment share of state-
owned firms from falling below the criti-
cal level of political support. The distor-
tionary policy to keep alive the state 
sector can then become a source of 
declining productivity, driving the coun-
try into a middle-income trap. Interest-
ingly, the collapse of the growth process 
is no necessity in his theory. If the cost of 
state capitalism becomes excessively high, 
the elite may peacefully surrender the 
monopoly of power inducing a serendipi-
tous transition to democracy. However, if 
state capitalism is relatively efficient, the 
elite may prefer to stick to power. An 
implication of Wang’s theory is that the 
recent improvement in the performance 
of state-owned enterprises may have a 
dark side: it may strengthen state capital-
ism and induce the resilience of the non-
democratic system. Thus, it could be 
good for economic growth in the short 
run, but eventually become bad for the 
long-run economic and institutional 
development of China.
In this paper, we have reviewed some of 
the central issues in the recent  economic 
development of China. We emphasize, 
with the aid of a model, the transitional 
nature of China’s growth process over the 
last three decades. China now faces a 
dilemma: the scope for growth driven by 
reallocation is diminishing, making future 
growth more dependent on local innova-
tion and human capital. Due to its large 
investments in R&D and education, 
China is likely to get a soft landing. 
While growth may slow down, we see no 
indication that China will get stuck in a 
middle-income trap. Still, the  current 
model of state capitalism relies on impor-
tant distortions. It is an open question 
whether the political elite has the incen-
tives to overcome such inefficiencies and 
complete the reform process (e.g., a fur-
ther reduction of the state’s role in eco-
nomic activity), as this may trigger an 
increase in the demand for political 
changes. In the future, fostering social 
cohesion and averting environmental 
disasters will be critical policy issues.
Conclusions
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Endnotes
1 The US, Western and Central Europe, Japan, and other Western offshoots altogether have a population of ca. 1 billion.
2 Using the definition of the World Bank, a person is living in extreme poverty if he or she lives on less than USD 1.25 daily.
3 Fairbank and Goldman (2006).
4 See Allen et al. (2011). Pomeranz (2000) goes beyond that and argues that, in the years from 1750 to 1800, living standards in the Yangtzi delta region 
were comparable to those of the most advanced European regions – i.e., England, the Netherlands. 
5 Platt 2012.
6 Meng et al. (2010).
7 The anti-ideological and pragmatic attitude of Deng Xiaoping is summarized well by the quote: “I don’t care if it’s a white cat or a black cat. It’s a good 
cat so long as it catches mice”, which he is said to have pronounced in 1961, during the Great Famine, speaking in support of measures of partial 
 decollectivization of land in order to raise agricultural production. Li (1994), p. 376.
8 Alder et al. (2013).
9 The figure shows the private share of employment in manufacturing in China (National Business Survey, 1998 – 2011). Two measures are plotted: 
First, DPE employment as a share of SOE+DPE employment, i.e., excluding foreign enterprises (FE) and collective enterprises. Second, the combined 
employment in DPE and FE as a share of total manufacturing employment.
10 See Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011) for more formal evidence of the trends discussed in this section.
11 Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011).
12 The central bank can be seen as an intermediary that absorbs the excess of domestic savings by offering regular banks domestic bonds, and invests the 
proceeds in foreign bonds.
13 It is of course not literally true that DPE receive no bank loans. In Special Economic Zones, we assume that DPE can borrow from banks but only up to a 
tight borrowing  constraint. So, the investments of DPE exceed entrepreneurial savings, but not enough to compensate for the imbalance described by 
Figures 5 and 8.
14 See Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011), pp. 229 – 231.
15 Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) show that, on average, countries with fast productivity growth have large trade surpluses and capital outflows, while 
 countries with a low productivity growth have trade deficits and capital inflows. They label this finding as the “allocation puzzle”, since it runs against the 
predictions of the standard economic theory according to which capital should flow to the most productive location.
16 Autor et al. (2013). This effect is (at least partially) offset by more jobs being created in export-oriented industries. Dauth et al. (2013) find that the  positive 
employment effect of trade with China and Eastern Europe actually dominates in Germany.
17 Song et al. (2013).
18 See again Song, Storesletten and Zilibotti (2011).
19 More precisely, the households’ net position follows a non-monotonic pattern: it declines until 2001, and increases thereafter.
20 The picture emerging from of Figures 8 and 9 is consistent with that of Figures 6 and 7: as transition goes by, credit-constrained (i.e., largely self-
financed) DPE crowd out SOE. Thus, banks become awash in cash and must invest in foreign bonds.
21 Chamon and Prasad (2010).
22 Liu et al. (2013).
23 Fang et al. (2010).
24 Banerjee et al. (2013).
25 Choukhmane et al. (2013).
26 Wei and Zhang (2011).
27 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).
28 See Acemoglu, Gancia and Zilibotti (2012).
29 See, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2006).
30 Barro and Lee (2013).
31 The growth rate of wages of college graduates was 240% between 1992 and 2007 compared with 135% for workers with middle school and below 
(Ge and Yang 2013).
32 OECD (2011).
33 In July 2013, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has liberalized loan rates. Namely, banks are since then allowed to offer lower rates to attract the best 
firms. Even more important, in August 2013 the PBOC announced the intention to liberalize deposit rates. So far, banks have not been allowed to 
 compete in offering higher deposit rates. This granted a major advantage to the large incumbent state-owned banks. These reforms may have far-reaching 
effects in reducing the credit market frictions outlined above.
34 Song et al. (2012).
35 See, e.g., Cai et al. (2006); Park et al. (2012).
36 Song, Storesletten, Wang and Zilibotti (2012).
37 For arguments for pre-funded pension systems, see for instance Feldstein and Liebman (2006) or Dunaway and Arora (2007). The study by Barr and 
 Diamond was published in 2008. 
38 Kahn and Yardley (2007).
39 Jia (2012).
40 Wang (2013). For an example of an empirical study documenting the wage premium of state sector employees see for instance Ge and Yang (2013).
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